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THE MINORITY'S DUTY OF LOYALTY IN
CLOSE CORPORATIONS
J.A.C. HETHERINGTON*
We are accustomed to thinking of corporate stock primarily as
property, and of stockholders, particularly minority stockholders, as
free agents in the exercise of their rights as property owners. The
purpose of this article is to show that there are situations in which
minority shareholders, like other holders of contract and property
rights, may be obligated when exercising their rights as owners of
stock to take the interests of other parties into account. The argu-
ments for this proposition are based on principles which are well
established in corporation law and in commercial law. The corpora-
tion law principle is the familiar duty of loyalty which is imposed on
management and controlling shareholders; the commercial concepts
are those requiring commercially reasonable behavior and the avoid-
ance of unconscionable conduct in business dealings. The corporation
and commercial law concepts are discussed briefly in parts I and II
of the article, and in part III the principles developed in the preceding
parts are related to the conduct of minority shareholders in close
corporations in certain types of situations.
I
THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF INDIVIDUALS WHO CONTROL
The most significant developments in corporation law during the
past decade have occurred in the area of management and insider
responsibilities. In the wake of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.1 and
its progeny,2 commentators have exhaustively examined and analyzed
the possible and probable impact of this developing body of law on
the securities market and on the business community generally.3
Securities trading is only one dimension of the broader subject of
* Professor of Law, University of Virginia. A.B. 1950, Dartmouth College; LL.B. 1953,
Cornell University; LL.M. 1956, University of California, Berkeley.
I. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
2. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1005 (1971); Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1970).
3. For a recent analysis and review of the developing law of management and insider
responsibilities, see Dooley, The Effects of Civil Liability on Investment Banking and the New
Issues Market, 58 VA. L. REV. 776, 810-33 (1972). The volume of literature commenting on
the subject is huge. See the references cited in H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 298 nn.3,
4, 14 (1970).
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management responsibility to the corporation and its shareholders.
Fiduciary responsibility embraces the entire range of management
functions and activities, from the duty of competence and diligence
to situations in which management's personal interests conflict with
those of the enterprise and its shareholders. Judicial opinions dealing
with the subject are often marked by a moral tone which is much less
apparent or altogether lacking in opinions treating other corporate
and commercial law subjects. Defendants whose conduct is found to
violate the duty of loyalty are not only legally liable in the same
manner as a person who fails to perform a contract or other legal
obligation, but, in addition, their conduct is condemned as unethical
and morally reprehensible.4
The fiduciary responsibility of management has two dimensions.
First, it embodies an obligation to manage the enterprise competently
and profitably. Second, it imposes an obligation on managers not to
exercise the prerogatives of control for personal gain or to advance
the interests of one group of owners at the expense of another. The
scope of these obligations cannot be defined precisely. It emerges
from a ruling-out process in the case law by which certain types of
conduct have been found inappropriate for those individuals charged
with "fiduciary" responsibilities. The cases may be conveniently sep-
arated into three distinct categories.
The first category involves situations in which management, in
taking action on behalf of the corporation, subordinates the corpora-
tion's interests to a conflicting outside interest, usually management's
own. The partially owned subsidiary cases are illustrative: In this type
of case, the parent-controlled management of the subsidiary acts on
the subsidiary's behalf in a manner which is detrimental to the subsid-
iary if it is viewed as a separate entity.5 From the standpoint of the
4. The classic expression of the duty of loyalty among co-adventurers is Judge Cardozo's
comment: "Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is . . . the
standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveter-
ate." Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928). The applicability of
this standard to corporate management is, of course, well established. See generally H. HENN,
supra note 3, § 238. The moral aspect of the legal principle is evident in the opinion of Chief
Judge Fuld in Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494,248 N.E.2d 910,301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969),
an insider trading case, where he approvingly quotes Professor Ballantine's statement that
"[d]ishonest directors should not find absolution from retributive justice by concealing their
identity from their victims under the mask of the stock exchange." Id. at 503, 248 N.E.2d at
915, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 85, citing H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 216 (1946).
5. See, e.g., Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941). Cf. Case v. New York
Cent. R.R., 15 N.Y.2d 150, 204 N.E.2d 643, 256 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1965).
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subsidiary's minority shareholders, the conflicting interest of the par-
ent is an outside adverse interest promoted by the subsidiary's own
management.
The second category of management responsibility cases involves
the diversion of business opportunities from the corporation to the
management group. Liability arises from the finding that the diverted
opportunity was one in which the corporation had an expectant inter-
est, usually as a result of its prior business activities. The relationship
between the corporation's existing business and the opportunity de-
fines-somewhat vaguely-the reach of the rule.' The rule applies
only to management and to the controlling shareholders; a non-
controlling shareholder who is not a director, officer or employee
appears to have no duty to refrain from intercepting a business oppor-
tunity in which the corporation might be interested, provided he does
not act on the basis of confidential information.7
The third category differs from the first two in that liability is not
dependent upon or related to management or control of the corpora-
tion. These cases involve the personal use by directors, officers and
employees of information acquired by them through their positions
in the corporation.' Confidential information obtained through an
individual's corporate office is business property of the corporation,
and personal use of such information may be considered a misappro-
priation of a corporate asset. The cases in this category may be
divided into two classes. The first includes the personal use of infor-
mation which results in direct damage or injury to the corporation,
such as in the case of misappropriation of a trade secret or theft of
customer lists for use in a competing business.' The second involves
6. It may be difficult to determine the scope of the corporation's interest in business
opportunities which the law will or should protect against management appropriation. See
Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del. Ch. 479, 121 A.2d 919 (1956). Where the corporate interest and
the intent to misappropriate are clear, punitive damages have been awarded. See International
Banker's Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1963).
7. See generally H. HENN, supra note 3, § 237; W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 666-81 (4th ed. 1969). None of the authorities cited by these authors appear to
involve an effort to impose the "corporate opportunity doctrine" on minority shareholders who
are not directors, officers, or employees. In this respect a shareholder's position differs from
that of a partner, who may neither compete with the partnership nor appropriate a "partnership
opportunity" to his own use. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 68, at 391
(1968).
8. A widely cited early case involving common law liability for insider trading is Brophy v.
Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949). The leading recent case is Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
9. See generally H. HENN, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, AND OTHER UNINCORPORATED Busi-
NESS ENTERPRISES 81-92 (1972).
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the use of inside information which does not cause any direct injury
or loss to the corporation; for this reason, it is arguable that the
insider misappropriated nothing of value to the corporation. The
insider stock trading cases often involve exactly this situation. The
corporation usually suffers no direct loss or injury from insider stock
transactions made on the basis of confidential information."° Profes-
sor H.G. Manne has argued that buyers and sellers of securities are,
in fact, betting on the accuracy of their analysis and information
concerning the security being traded, that generally neither party to
a securities transaction on a stock exchange or in the over-the-counter
market need disclose his information to the other, and that insider
trading should not be subject to special rules." However, the course
of the law has now been clearly set against such insider activities, 2
and the judicial rhetoric is thunderously moral. 3
In effect, the insider trading cases create a new fiduciary responsi-
bility which runs from one group of shareholders-those with inside
information material to stock prices-to other shareholders and po-
tential shareholders. Whenever information material to the value of
a security is not generally available to securities traders, the market
is less likely to price that security at a level which accurately reflects
its worth in relation to other securities. The resulting inaccuracy of
the market price is corrected when the previously undisclosed infor-
mation becomes known. As a result of the price correction some
traders get a windfall-those who sold before a price decline or
bought before a rise-and those who did the opposite will suffer a
10. This was precisely the case in Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910,
301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969), where it appeared that insiders had sold their stock in response to
confidential information indicating that the corporation's earnings had been substantially re-
duced because of an increase in the cost of services rendered by its principal supplier. The price
of the company's stock dropped from $28 to $11 when the news became public, and the insiders
were held liable to the corporation for the difference between the price that they were paid prior
to disclosure and the price which they would have received after it. The court conceded that
the corporation had suffered no direct financial loss because of the insiders' trading and empha-
sized the deterrent aspect of the rule which is analogous to the prohibition against a trustee's
personal use of information acquired in his capacity as trustee. Id. at 498, 248 N.E.2d at 912,
301 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
II. The arguments for allowing insider trading have been powerfully presented in H.
MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966). For a review of Professor Manne's
book, see Hetherington, Insider Trading and the Logic of the Law, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 720.
Generally, insider trading inflicts no direct monetary loss on the corporate employer. See, e.g.,
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
12. The views expressed in Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301
N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969), have prevailed.
13. See note 4 supra.
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loss. It is apparent, therefore, that insider trading itself injures no
one, but that the withholding of information creates the possibility
for fortuitous profits and losses, and that corporate insiders and their
associates on the whole have a better chance than outsiders to make
profits. There is no doubt that trading on confidential information
offends the courts' sense of fairness, and probably that of stockhold-
ers and of the public generally. For this reason, the prohibition of
insider trading undoubtedly helps to maintain public confidence in
the integrity of the market (in other words, in the accuracy of market
prices). In addition, by depriving management of an incentive to
delay disclosure in order to make trading profits, it may expedite the
flow of price-relevant information from securities issuers to the mar-
ket. Finally, since the purpose and function of the rule is to deter,
rather than to compensate for actual loss caused by the insider-
defendant, the limits of the liability tend to be flexible and unstable.
Presumably liability will be extended to the point to which the courts
think it needs to be carried in order to deter. Thus far only corporate
insiders and those persons to whom they have given inside informa-
tion have been held liable. 14 It remains to be seen whether it is feasi-
ble, desirable or necessary to extend liability beyond this group.
For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that existing preced-
ents impose fiduciary obligations: (1) on corporate managers and
controlling shareholders when they act on behalf of the corporation
or appropriate to themselves business opportunities which would be
of interest to an enterprise engaged in the corporation's business; and
(2) on all corporate insiders when they attempt to profit personally
from information gained through their connection with the corpora-
tion. The first obligation clearly runs to the corporation; the second
may run either to the corporation alone, as in the case of misappro-
priation of business information, or to both the corporation and those
persons with whom the insider deals, as in the case of insider trading.
II
THE DUTY TO ACT "FAIRLY"IN NON-FIDUCIARY BUSINESS
RELATIONSHIPS
In ordinary business dealings between business organizations and
14. In the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, insiders were held liable for the profits made by those
individuals whom they had informed (tippees), but not for the gains of the tippees' tippees.
Where should liability end? The district court in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, considering the
problem to be one of deterrence, thought it had gone far enough. 312 F. Supp. 77, 95 (S.D.N.Y.
1970). The tippees may themselves be liable. See Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
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individuals, neither party to a transaction is a fiduciary of the other.
The usual transaction is, of course, an exchange in which goods or
services are bought and sold. The law does not make the participants
in such transactions guardians of each other's interests. The legal
obligation of each is simply to perform the specific obligation he has
undertaken. 5 The distinction between this relationship and the rela-
tionship existing between corporations and the individuals who con-
trol and manage them seems clear.
This apparently clear distinction is neither as clear nor as great
as it initially appears. In the name of good faith, fair dealing, and
similar concepts, the courts have imposed limits on the bargaining
process and on the exercise of contract" and property rights in non-
fiduciary business dealings. The difficulty with such criteria, when
they are used as a basis for determining the legality of business con-
duct, is the inevitable imprecision of the standards. This problem has
received considerable attention in current periodical literature dealing
with the Uniform Commercial Code." What is "unconscionable"
conduct in commercial and consumer transactions? What do "com-
mercially reasonable" and "good faith" mean in business transac-
tions? The difficulty is compounded by the fact that the standards of
conduct required by these criteria vary with the situation to which
they are applied. 9 Yet, however unsatisfactory these flexible concepts
15. Of course, disagreements may arise concerning the scope of the obligation which the
contracting parties have undertaken. Litigation dealing with such questions is an important part
of contract law. For a collection of cases involving issues concerned with the nature and scope
of contractual obligations, see L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 618-49 (3d
ed. 1972).
16. These obligations are not confined to situations in which a final agreement is reached
between the parties. They arise in the course of the negotiating process even if no bargain is
ever made. See generally Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine,
78 YALE L.J. 343 (1969).
17. For a discussion of restraints on the abuse of property rights in real property, see 5 R.
Powell, Real Property 1 1 704-07 (1971).
18. See, e.g., Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969); Farn-
sworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666 (1963); Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The
Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967); Murray, Unconscionability: Uncon-
scionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1969); Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law
and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968).
19. In the UCC some standards are explicitly directed toward particular types of business
dealing. See, for example, the special definition of good faith between merchants. UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-103(l)(b). Of course, courts commonly take the circumstances of the
parties into consideration in applying such criteria to individual behavior. A notable recent
example which has provoked much discussion is Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
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of fairness are when subjected to intensive technical analysis,"0 they
at least establish that in a variety of business situations, property and
contract rights must be exercised in conformity with a minimum
standard of business morality. The questions involved in a determina-
tion of whether a particular exercise of contract or property rights is
made in good faith or is commercially reasonable are illustrated in
cases arising from situations in which one party to a consensual
ongoing relationship attempts to exercise his apparently unqualified
right to discontinue the relationship. In a variety of contexts the
courts have restricted the power to terminate.
The retaliatory eviction cases are good examples of situations in
which courts have limited the right of a party to a consensual contrac-
tual relationship to end the arrangement. A number of courts have
now held that a landlord may not terminate a tenancy at will in
retaliation for the conduct of the tenant in reporting the landlord's
violation of applicable housing regulations." These decisions cannot
be reconciled with the conventional analysis of tenancies at will. The
tenant under such an arrangement has no legal right to an extension
of the tenancy beyond each rental period. Provided he complies with
applicable procedural requirements, the owner appears to be entitled
to repossess the property at any time.
In explaining the difference between the common law property
rule and the newer, more restrictive termination standard, one court
observed that, although a property owner may terminate a tenancy
at will for any or no reason, he may not evict "simply" because the
tenant has reported housing violations to the appropriate authori-
ties.2 It is probably true that if property owners in a tight housing
market may evict tenants who report housing violations, some ten-
ants will be deterred from reporting infractions, and the effectiveness
of remedial housing legislation is likely to be reduced. Eviction under
these circumstances would therefore tend to frustrate the public pol-
icy expressed in the legislation. Nevertheless, limiting the property
owner's right to terminate results in a significant alteration of the
350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The difficulties raised by cases of this type are extensively
treated in the authorities cited in note 18 supra.
20. In particular, see Leff, supra note 18.
21. See, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis.
2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970), noted in 54 MARQ. L. REV. 239 (1971). See generally
McElhaney, Retaliatory Evictions: Landlords, Tenants and Law Reform, 29 MD. L. REV. 193
(1969); Note, Retaliatory Eviction: The Tenant's Right to Challenge the Landlord's Motive,
21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 986 (1970).
22. Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 399, 173 N.W.2d 297, 302 (1970).
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traditional relationship between landlord and tenant. The tenant has
achieved a tenure that he did not have before. There seems to be no
obvious or convincing reason for distinguishing between a tenant's
reporting housing violations and a tenant's other lawful or constitu-
tionally protected conduct of which the owner may disapprove. The
tenant's interest in the continuation of the tenancy at will has become
an expectancy which, under some circumstances, the law now pro-
tects against "unconscionable" termination-that is, termination
which is motivated by a desire to punish and which therefore is not
good faith performance or commercially reasonable behavior.23 In
other words, under some circumstances the legality of the exercise of
property rights may be determined by the motives of the acting party.
Certain motives-for example, retaliation for conduct favored by the
law-are contrary to public policy, and the exercise of property
rights, such as eviction, in furtherance of those motives is conse-
quently unlawful. 24
Retaliatory cancellations of insurance policies may present simi-
lar problems. For example, in 1968, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that a dental malpractice insurer could not cancel
the policy of its dentist-insured in retaliation for his testifying in a
malpractice case against another dentist whom it also insured.13 In
23. The tenant may, as a result, also be protected against reasonable behavior by the
landlord. Suppose, for example, that the landlord who has been prevented from collecting rent
because of housing code violations, as in Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1968), decides not to correct the violations, but instead to withdraw the premises from
the market. In such a case, the landowner may evict only if his good faith is established-the
landlord must show that his motive in seeking to evict the tenant is not based on the tenant's
failure to pay the rent. Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 865 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
24. It seems prudent to confine the limitations on the property owner's right to terminate
discussed in the text to cases in which there is an existing economic relationship between the
landlord and the tenant. For example, if a landlord is given a choice between two prospective
tenants, one of whom is known by the landlord to be a person who has reported housing
violations in the past on other properties, the landlord could probably freely and frankly choose
the other. Apart from special situations where considerations such as race may be proscribed,
suppliers and buyers of goods and services probably have more freedom in the selection of those
persons with whom they will deal, than in cases where they are involved in an ongoing relation-
ship. The latter circumstances give rise to expectations of reasonable behavior which, as the
cited cases indicate, may be protected against some types of "unfair" response.
25. L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1968), noted in 54 IowA L.
REv. 649 (1969). Contra, Camp v. Aetna Ins. Co., 170 Ga. 46, 152 S.E. 41 (1930) (insurer's
motive in cancelling immaterial). Compare L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., supra, with
NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972), where the Supreme Court held that an employer may
not retaliate against employees who give written statements in connection with an unfair labor
practice investigation, despite the fact that immunity for such conduct was not directly provided
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reversing the district court's dismissal of the complaint, the court of
appeals stated that, although the policy provided that the insurer was
entitled to cancel at any time, if the plaintiff could show that the
insurer's purpose was to intimidate him, the cancellation would be set
aside.26 Clearly, the alleged reason for the cancellation was not di-
rectly related to the risk assumed by the insurer on its contract with
the particular insured. Apart from the insurer's allegedly punitive
motive, its business reason for exercising its cancellation privilege
could have been to deter other insureds from testifying against its
policyholders. Discouraging insured dentists from testifying against
each other in malpractice cases could be in the economic interest of
the company and all its insureds; however, in the court's view, this
rationale did not justify the cancellation, because any benefit to the
insurer and its policyholders from discouraging the plaintiff and
other dentists from testifying in malpractice litigation would be ob-
tained at the expense of a strong public interest in having testimony
fully available to the courts, particularly in medical malpractice
cases .2 The result of the case is a clear limitation on the use by the
insurer of its explicit right to cancel under the policy: It is prevented
from exercising a contract right for a permissible business purpose
(reducing its exposure to liability) because of the putative impact of
the cancellation both on the behavior of the plaintiff insured2s and
the actions or the conduct of other policyholders who might learn of
the company's response.
In both the eviction and the cancellation cases, the courts found
a public policy that strongly supported the conduct of one party
which had led the other party to attempt to discontinue the suppos-
edly consensual relationship.29 It is not clear whether the same results
for by statute. The result is similar to that in the L'Orange case. The decision is based directly
on a public policy protecting employees who assist investigations of violations of federal law.
The statute itself prohibits employer retaliation against employees who actually file grievances
under the Act. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1970). See also
NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers Union, 391 U.S. 418 (1967), holding that while a
union's power to discipline its members is protected under the National Labor Relations Act,
it may not exercise that power against a member who has filed a grievance under the Act
against the union, where the grievance "touches a part of the public domain covered by the
Act." Id. at 428.
26. 394 F.2d at 63.
27. Id. at 61-62. The court referred to the "conspiracy of silence" in such cases. Id. at 62
n.2, citing Cohn, Medical Malpractice Litigation, 52 A.B.A.J. 32 (1966).
28. At the time when the insured's policy was cancelled, a motion for a new trial was
pending in the case in which he had testified. 394 F.2d at 59.
29. Another area in which the problem of abusive exercise of contract rights has attracted
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would have been reached if the retaliation had been aimed at conduct
which, although lawful, was not protected by a strong and specific
public interest.30 The exercise or threat to exercise property and
contract rights in order to influence the lawful conduct of others is a
familiar and often legitimate bargaining tactic in commercial deal-
ings. Generally, the fact that one party's conduct is lawful or even
constitutionally protected does not mean that those persons who deal
with him may not disapprove of the conduct and discontinue their
business relationship because of that disapproval. It is difficult to
state in general terms when pressure of this kind ceases to be a
permissible bargaining tactic." A similar type of economic pressure
was involved in American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve
Bank,32 where the Supreme Court held that it would be unlawful for
a federal reserve bank to accumulate checks drawn on a bank which
considerable attention in recent years is franchise termination. See Gellhorn, Limitations on
Contract Termination Rights-Franchise Cancellations, 1967 DUKE L.J. 465.
30. The cases involving nonrenewal of annual employment contracts of nontenured teachers
present similar problems. The Supreme Court has held that a nontenured teacher at a state
institution is not entitled to a hearing when he is denied a contract for the following year. Board
of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The Court pointed out that the state
had not in any way disparaged the teacher's professional reputation but merely had not re-
newed a consensual relationship which had expired. In the posture in which it reached the
Supreme Court, the case did not present the question whether renewal could be denied if it
were shown that the reason for nonrenewal was the institution's disapproval of the constitution-
ally protected conduct of the teacher. Id. at 574. For a survey of the cases in related areas in-
volving protection of economic interests against summary termination without a prior oppor-
tunity to be heard, see Comment, The Growth of Procedural Due Process into a New Sub-
stance: An Expanding Protection for Personal Liberty and a "Specialized Type of Property
. . . in our Economic System," 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 502 (1971).
31. An instructive comparison may be made of two cases dealing with the question of
whether or not a supplier who has been sued by a customer for violation of the anti-trust laws
may, in retaliation for the bringing of the suit by its customer, refuse to continue dealing with
him. In House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1962), the
Second Circuit held that such a refusal was not a Sherman Act violation on the facts and was
not actionable as a tort, although the district court had found that the purpose of discontinuing
relations with the plaintiff was retaliatory. Id. at 869. The court of appeals said:
"fundamental assumptions in free business enterprise," including the belief that "each
business enterprise must be free to select its business relations in its own interest," may
justify or excuse the act of one who causes harm to another as a collateral consequence
of his refusal to continue a business relation terminable at will. Id. at 872.
On the other hand, in Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962),
the Third Circuit issued an injunction against such retaliation. The court of appeals stated:
The point plaintiff convincingly makes is that it will be unable to secure the cooperation
of other wholesalers and of retailers to be witnesses because they fear the same sort of
retaliatory action that plaintiff has experienced. Certainly, a court can act where a
party's conduct is calculated to frustrate litigation. Id. at 728.
32. 256 U.S. 350 (1921).
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was not a member of the federal reserve system and then to present
them at one time for payment, where the purpose of the practice was
to embarrass the drawee and thereby to force it to join the federal
reserve system. Ordinarily, of course, the holder of a draft is free to
present it or to delay presentation at its pleasure. Counsel for the
reserve bank argued that a creditor cannot be prevented from fore-
closing a mortgage "because he acted from disinterested malevolence
and not from a desire to get his money. ' 33 The court responded that
"most rights are qualified," illustrating the point by saying that a
man has a right to give his money away, but if he does so "to induce
another to steal or murder, the purpose of the act makes it a
crime. ' 34 The court characterized the alleged conduct as "warfare"
against the state banks and concluded that the "ulterior purpose"
underlying the retention of the checks and their presentation en masse
would make such conduct unlawful. 35 In current terminology, the
alleged conduct was "commercially unreasonable."
Similarly, in a very different context, a New Jersey court held that
a purchaser who was seeking a release from a contract for construc-
tion of a dwelling in a residential subdivision and a return of his down
payment could not lawfully bring pressure on the builder to comply
with his demands by threatening to resell to an "undesirable" pur-
chaser if the refund were refused.3 As in the banking case, the
threatened conduct was not in itself unlawful. Presumably, the bank
could have delayed presentment of checks for legitimate reasons.
Similarly here, the buyer could lawfully have resold the house to any
purchaser, including an undesirable one. In neither case was the
objective of the challenged conduct unlawful. The reserve bank (it
was alleged) wanted the state bank to join the federal reserve system,
and the house buyer wanted his deposit returned. Both of these acts
would have been entirely lawful. Furthermore, unlike the situation in
which the insurer cancelled the dentist's malpractice policy because
of his testimony, there was no public policy against the conduct which
33. Id. at 358.
34. Id. The analogy is not exact, of course, because it not only would be lawful but also
would or could be in the public interest for the state bank to join the federal reserve system.
35. Id. at 359. The Court further stated that in creating the federal reserve system, Congress
did not intend to "sanction" such attacks on state institutions. Id. This statement suggests an
ultra vires limitation on the reserve bank's conduct.
36. Wolf v. Marlton Corp., 57 N.J. Super. 278, 154 A.2d 625 (1959). The court observed
that the fact that the threatened resale would be lawful did not prevent the threat from being
wrongful. Id. at 287, 154 A.2d at 630. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 492 (1932). See
also Hochman v. Zigler's Inc., 139 N.J. Eq. 139, 50 A.2d 97 (Ch. 1946).
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the reserve bank and the house buyer were attempting to induce on
the part of the other party. Nevertheless, the decisions establish that
the state bank and the builder could not lawfully be subjected to this
kind of pressure. 7 The drawee bank was entitled to have checks
presented to it in a routine manner, or at least not to have them
presented in an extraordinary manner for a coercive purpose; the
builder had a right not to be forced to return a deposit which it was
legally entitled to retain. The illegality of the conduct in each case
appears to lie in the effort of one party to influence future conduct
by threatening deliberate injury to an existing contractual or property
right or business interest of the other party. 8 For the purposes of
this article, the significant point is that the exercise of property and
contract rights may be limited by basic assumptions of the legal
system concerning the use to which these rights may be put. Notions
about duress, coercion, unconscionability, good faith, and commer-
cial reasonableness regulate and restrict the exercise of contract and
property rights in commercial intercourse. Together, they define the
limits of permissible bargaining conduct in commercial dealings and
give legal meaning to minimum standards of business morality.
37. The New Jersey court said:
[Blut where a party for purely malicious and unconscionable motives threatens to resell
• . . to a purchaser, specially selected because he would be undesirable, for the sole
purpose of injuring the builder's business, fundamental fairness requires the conclusion
that his conduct . . . be deemed "wrongful," as the term is used in the law of duress.
57 N.J. Super. at 288, 154 A.2d at 630.
38. It is difficult to ascertain the grounds for liability in the cases discussed in the text.
There is language in the opinions which may indicate that the basis for decision is some type
of duress. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 492-99 (1932). "[D]uress going to inotives
consists in the threat of illegal acts. Ordinarily, what you may do without liability you may
threaten to do without liability." Silsbee v. Webber, 171 Mass. 378, 380 (1898) (Holmes, J.),
quoted in Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 618
(1943). However, this formulation does not explain the result in the Federal Reserve Bank case
in which Justice Holmes also wrote the Supreme Court's opinion. Further, although
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 493 (1932), indicates that generally duress involves conduct
which is unlawful without regard to the motive of the actor, some of the illustrations of section
493 contain examples of threatened conduct which is itself lawful. In some of these the drafts-
men conclude that duress is present where the conduct, although not unlawful, is nonetheless
"wrongful." Id. § 493(d), Illustrations 5-9, 12-14; id. § 493(e), Illustrations 17-20. In others,
duress is not found. Id. § 493(d), Illustrations 10, 15; id. § 493(e), Illustration 21, In still
others, it is concluded that there may or may not be duress. Id. § 493(d), Illustrations I1, 16.
No principle for distinguishing the examples is given. In contrast to duress, motive is the
principal element in liability under the doctrine of "prima facie tort." It is noteworthy, however,
that the courts have had similar difficulty in stating precisely the limits of the liability based
on this theory. Appropriate references to current tort materials are contained in W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS § 5, at 26 (4th ed. 1971).
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III
THE MINORITY SHAREHOLDER: RIGHTS VS. DUTIES
The general propositions developed in parts I and II lead to the
principal questions with which this article is concerned: Are there
circumstances in which requirements of fairness and good faith in
commercial dealings apply to non-controlling shareholders of close
corporations in the exercise of their rights as stockholders? May
minority shareholders be subject to a duty of loyalty comparable, in
some situations, to that imposed on those in control of a corporation?
These two inquiries, the first based on the current rhetoric of com-
mercial law and the second phrased in terms of corporate managerial
responsibility, present basically the same issues. 9
In the literature of close corporations, the minority shareholder
invariably appears in the role of a victim of majority oppression."
The opposite possibility seems unimportant: There is no need for
concern about the oppressive propensities of persons who lack the
power of implementation. The duty of loyalty imposed upon majority
shareholders in the exercise of their power to control the corporation
has been regarded as an exception to the general rule that sharehold-
ers are not answerable for the purposes behind their voting or failing
to vote their shares. The basis of the exception is the power of the
majority to control the enterprise and investment of the minority.
However, an examination of the case law reveals that shareholders
have not been free to pursue their own interests in total disregard of
the interests of the corporation and other shareholders when voting
39. It is arguable that the discussion in the text of a duty of loyalty for minority sharehold-
ers should not and need not be limited to closely held corporations. The discussion is limited
to the close corporation because the problem of the obstructive minority is most likely to arise
in corporations in which the shares are closely held and management is associated with and
directly responsible to a majority faction of shareholders. Shareholders in publicly held firms
are typically passive investors who follow management recommendations in voting their shares
in the usual course of events. Those individuals who lack confidence in management sell their
shares. Of course, power struggles and proxy fights do occur, but, partly because of the availa-
bility of a public market for shares, the obstruction-avoidance-litigation method of settlement
seems less likely to occur. From the standpoint of the expectations of the parties, neither
management nor the shareholding public envisions that they are engaged together in a common
enterprise to which the shareholders owe any obligation with respect to the exercise of their
rights as owners of stock. On the other hand, where stock is held by a few shareholders all of
whom are more or less directly associated with the business, the shareholders are likely to view
themselves as joint venturers in a common enterprise. There are obviously many situations
between these two extreme cases.
40. See, e.g., F. O'NEAL & J. DERWIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS
ASSOCIATES: "SQUEEZE OUTS" IN SMALL ENTERPRISES (1961).
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their shares. After reviewing the cases, one writer found that the vote-
as-you-please "rule" has usually been enunciated by the courts in
cases where the challenged vote was not decisive.4 He concluded that
the proposition that the shareholder may vote as he wishes is "mere
window dressing for the decisive finding that the challenged action is
valid and fair. 4 2
Nor are shareholders free to separate the voting rights of their
shares from other aspects of ownership. Voting trusts, the classical
device for separating the voting franchise from the other rights of
share ownership, are regulated by statute and limited as to duration
in almost all states. 3 Similarly, the courts have looked with disfavor
on irrevocable proxies. Like agency relationships generally, a proxy
is regarded by the courts as a continuing consensual relationship
which is revocable unless the proxy holder has some property or
security interest which makes him more than an agent. 4 These re-
strictions on arrangements which separate beneficial ownership from
voting rights are derived from a fundamental assumption about the
corporate franchise. This assumption is that the vote will be exercised
by a person interested in promoting the corporation's welfare and the
value of the investment represented by the stock. Hence, a contract-
ing stockholder, the corporation, and the corporation's other stock-
holders are to be protected against arrangements under which control
over voting rights and of the enterprise passes to one who has no
ownership interest in the shares. The rule against vote selling is
merely an illustration of this principle in a particularly obvious and
blatant case."
Clearly, the possibilities for irresponsible exercise of a share-
holder's prerogatives do not end with irrevocable proxies." A share-
41. See Sneed, The Stockholder May Vote as He Pleases: Theory and Fact, 22 U. PITT,
L. REv. 23 (1960).
42. Id. at 54.
43. 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 5.09 (2d ed. 1971).
44. The status of the irrevocable proxy has not been clearly resolved. See, e.g., Ecclestone
v. Indialantic, Inc., 319 Mich. 248, 29 N.W.2d 679 (1947), noted in 47 MicH. L. REv. 547
(1949); State v. Pacific Waxed Paper Co., 22 Wash. 2d 844, 157 P.2d 707 (1945). Cf N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 609 (McKinney 1963), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1971). This statute
enumerates situations in which an irrevocable proxy may be given. Generally, irrevocable
proxies are allowed where the proxy-holder has a direct personal interest in the shares. The
section also explicitly prohibits the sale of votes.
45. See, e.g., Palmbaum v. Magulsky, 217 Mass. 306, 104 N.E. 746 (1914). See also cases
cited in W. CARY, supra note 7, at 377.
46. Any arrangement which puts the right to vote shares beyond the control of the beneficial
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holder who himself has some ulterior purpose in view may exercise
his rights as an owner of stock in a way which is, and is intended to
be, detrimental to the business interests of the corporation or the
other shareholders.4 7 However, an adverse interest becomes impor-
tant only when the shareholder's vote determines the outcome of a
corporate issue. When the vote of any shareholder is decisive on any
question, he is to that extent in control of the corporation.
Minority shareholders are most likely to have a control position
where by statute, article provision, or by-law the approval of more
than a majority is required for shareholder action.48 The purpose of
unanimity and greater-than-majority voting requirements is to pro-
tect the minority against majority oppression. The veto protects the
minority by giving it a degree of control over corporate decisions. As
soon as the minority has a degree of control over corporate decision
making, however, the question arises as to whether it should not also
be subject to a duty of loyalty comparable to that routinely borne by
the majority and controlling shareholders. The problem is illustrated
in the following examples, both of which are based on cases decided
several years ago.
Case L" Company A was a closely held corporation engaged in
the manufacture and sale of bleach. It was not successful, and the
majority shareholder, who had managed the business, negotiated an
owner carries a similar risk. Voting trusts are another example which is regulated by statute.
See ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 34 (2d ed. 1971); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 621
(McKinney 1963). It would not appear to be difficult to devise an arrangement for the transfer
of a limited interest in shares of stock which would be sufficient to avoid the prohibition against
transfer of the power to vote alone.
47. For example, see Case II, infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
48. The former provisions of the Model Act are fairly typical. The Act required the favor-
able vote of two-thirds of the outstanding voting shares for amendments of the articles, mergers
or consolidation, sales of assets of the corporation other than in the regular course of business,
and voluntary dissolution. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. §§ 54(c), 67,72(c), 77(3) (1960).
Except in these special cases, only a majority of a quorum was required, and in the absence of
a special provision in the articles, a quorum was a majority of the outstanding shares. Id. § 30.
The two-thirds requirement was abandoned in the most recent version of the Model Act which
requires only an affirmative vote. ABA MODEL BUs. CORP. AcT ANN. §§ 59(c), 73, 79(c), 84(c)
(2d ed. 1971). This more recent version still provides that a majority of the shares entitled to
vote constitutes a quorum. Id. § 32. The Act permits both the quorum and the fraction of the
quorum needed for shareholder action to be increased, apparently to unanimity. Id. § 143. Of
course, unanimity may be required in fact, as where the shares are evenly divided between two
shareholders, or where the minority is large enough to prevent the majority from obtaining the
number of votes required for affirmative action under the statute or under an article or by-law
provision validly requiring more than a majority for shareholder action.
49. See Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952).
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arrangement under which the business would be taken over by a
national manufacturer and distributor of household products. Under
the proposal, the majority shareholder of Company A was to be hired
by the purchaser for the purpose of developing the market for the
company's product. The purchaser demanded an option to purchase
all outstanding stock of Company A, under a price formula which
was fair and reasonable under the circumstances.
Shareholder X of Company A refused to agree to tender his
minority shares to the purchaser unless the majority shareholder
agreed to pay him a portion of the salary to be paid to the majority
shareholder by the purchaser under the proposal. In order to force
the tender of X's share and thereby meet the conditions imposed by
the purchaser, Company A was merged into a new corporation, Com-
pany B, under an agreement whereby the existing shareholders of
Company A would receive redeemable preferred shares of Company
B. The majority shareholder of Company A, who held all the com-
mon stock of Company B, then offered pro rata participation in the
Company B common to all shareholders of Company A except
Shareholder X.
Subsequently, the arrangement was sustained against an attack
by X, who was limited to his statutory dissent and appraisal remedy
under the merger statute." The proposed arrangement was found to
be advantageous to the corporation and fair to all shareholders.5 X's
attempt to bargain for more than a pro rata share of the total pro-
ceeds of the transaction was described as "wholly improper;" yet X
was, in fact, merely imposing conditions on which he would tender
his stock. The court was not called upon to decide directly whether
X could impose such conditions; the issue before it was whether it
would interfere on X's behalf with the proposed merger which would
force X to sell his shares at appraised value. On the basis of its
conclusion that X's conduct was unfair, the court declined to interfere
with the forced sale which was imposed upon him through the merger.
Case II." Company C operated a towing and barge business. Its
50. Id. at 296, 242 P.2d at 1032.
51. Id. at 301, 242 P.2d at 1034. The lower court's finding on this point had been that the
proposal "was advantageous not only to the defendant ... but also to all of the other stock-
holders of the corporation; . . . this proposal represented the only real chance for the stock-
holders . . . to get anything out of their investment." Id. at 300, 242 P.2d at 1034.
52. Id. at 305, 242 P.2d at 1036. The trial court had found that this self-interested purpose
was "the real reason for plaintiffs objection" to the transaction. Id. at 299, 242 P.2d at 1033.
53. See Aiple v. Twin City Barge & Towing Co., 274 Minn. 38, 143 N.W.2d 374 (1966).
[Vol. 1972:921
MINORITY LOYALTY
management decided that more equity capital was desirable in order
to expand the business and sought to increase the authorized capital
stock. The necessary amendment of the articles of incorporation was
defeated by the vote of Shareholder Y, who held more than one-third
of the outstanding shares. Y owned two tugs which formerly had been
leased by Company C. Since the company had discontinued this
arrangement and purchased its own equipment, Y had leased his
boats to a competing firm in which he had a substantial interest.
In order to circumvent Y's veto, the board of directors of Com-
pany C caused Company D to be organized, and then proposed to
transfer C's shipyard division, which comprised about ten percent of
its assets, in exchange for 4,000 of the 50,000 authorized shares of
Company D. Shareholder Y successfully challenged this arrangement
on the ground that it was an improper attempt to circumvent his right
to veto an amendment of the articles of incorporation. s4 The court
took the position that the statute gave the owner of more than one-
third of the voting shares the right to prevent an amendment of the
articles of incorporation, and that his motive in exercising this veto
power was irrelevant:
It is unnecessary for us to speculate on the possible effects which might
flow from the action of the parent corporation if permitted. It might well be
that the plan is constructive from the standpoint of what might be profitable
for the stockholders. But we are concerned with legal rights ...
If, as it appears, we are faced with the paradox of the minority stockholder
using a statute designed for his protection to obstruct and interfere with the
best interests of the corporation, the problem is one which should be called to
the attention of the legislature.'
It is clear, therefore, that the court recognized that the case did
not involve a difference of opinion concerning the best interests of the
parent company; the difference 'as between a majority which was
seeking to advance, and a minority which was seeking to hinder, the
company's development and profitability.
The contrast in the results in Cases I and II is striking. In Case
I, the court permitted a transparent maneuver to succeed in forcing
the liquidation of a minority shareholder's equity investment, clearly
a gross infringement of an "owner's right." In Case II, a relatively
minor reduction in a minority shareholder's degree of control which
was in no way detrimental to his interests as a shareholder was pre-
54. Id. at 45, 143 N.W.2d at 379.
55. Id.
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vented. In both instances, action which concededly was beneficial to
the interests of all the shareholders was proposed. In each case, the
minority shareholder was in a position to block the simplest and most
direct way of accomplishing the transaction, and did so apparently
for reasons which were personal to him and contrary to the interest
of the corporation or the other shareholders. There were differences:
In Case I, the minority shareholder apparently had tried to overreach
the majority by obtaining a side payment to which he had no "equita-
ble" claim; in Case II, the shareholder had committed no such overtly
inequitable conduct.
Both X and Y sought equitable relief-X against an arrangement
designed to avoid the payment he had demanded, and Y against
action intended to circumvent his veto of the initial form of the
transaction. In Case I, the minority shareholder's prior offer to with-
draw his veto for a price probably weakened his claim for equitable
relief and inclined the court to leave him to the statutory dissent and
appraisal remedy. One also suspects that if there had been a genuine
difference of opinion on the merits of the proposed sale of the com-
pany's business, the result might have been different."
The opposing conclusions seem to follow from the differing ana-
lytical approaches adopted by the courts in the two cases. In Case I,
the court began with the facts and adopted the lower court's finding
that from the standpoint of the common interest of the shareholders
the proposed sale would be beneficial. In the light of this conclusion,
the overreaching conduct of X, who was seeking equitable relief on
the ground that the available statutory remedy was inadequate, may
have been decisive.
In Case II, the court's analysis began with the statutory right of
the holder of more than one-third of the shares to defeat a proposed
amendment. The next consideration was: Under what circumstances
does the statute contemplate that an amendment may be accom-
plished without shareholder approval? Not surprisingly, the statute
was silent on this point, and the way was then open for the court to
conclude that allowing the creation of a subsidiary to accomplish the
substance of an amendment "would establish a precedent inconsistent
with the clear intent of the statute as it presently exists.""7 The result
56. There was case law to support the opposite result. See, e.g., Outwater v. Public Serv.
Corp., 143 A. 729 (N.J. Ch. 1928); Eisenberg v. Central Zone Property Corp., 306 N.Y. 58,
115 N.E.2d 652 (1953); Theis v. Spokane Falls Gas Light Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 P. 1004 (1904).
57. 274 Minn. at 46, 143 N.W.2d at 379.
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of the court's decision is that the minority veto power not only
reaches amendments but also in some cases reaches transactions
which could be accomplished by a variety of routes including amend-
ment of the articles." The process of treating both amendment and
alternative tactics in a similar fashion leads finally to the conclusion
that the motives of the minority are not relevant in either situation.
(One wonders whether the result would have been different if the
majority had first attempted to create the subsidiary without the
prior abortive attempt to amend the articles.)
The fundamental question posed by these cases is: What duties (if
any) should the law impose upon a minority shareholder in the exer-
cise of legal rights attached to his stock? The court in Case II took
an expansive view of the minority shareholder's rights. A comparable
approach in Case I would have led the court to conclude that the
minority shareholder's refusal to sell his stock could not be circum-
vented by a merger arranged solely for the purpose of forcing the sale
of his shares.59 Under this view of the shareholder's right to withhold
his shares, there would be no impropriety in his setting practically any
condition on sale. Reaching the opposite conclusion, the court in
Case I did not, and did not need to, decide directly that X had an
obligation to offer his shares at the price acceptable to the other
shareholders. But this propostion is suggested indirectly by the
court's refusal to strike down a transparent maneuver which was
58. The alternative tactic aspect of Case I closely resembles the de facto merger situation.
In substance, two separate incorporated enterprises can be combined and continuity of owner-
ship preserved in any one of three ways: (1) through a statutory merger of consolidation; (2)
through a sale of the assets of one for stock of the other; (3) through an exchange of stock of
one for stock of the other. Under the Model Act, dissenting shareholders have appraisal rights
under the first and second alternatives, but not under the third. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr
ANN. § 80 (2d ed. 1971). The de facto merger doctrine preserves the appraisal right in the third
case. See, e.g., Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 60 N.J. Super. 333, 159 A.2d 146,
aff'd, 33 N.J. 72, 161 A.2d 474 (1960). Courts following the opposite view regard each separate
procedure as independent, and confine the shareholders to their rights under the form of the
transaction selected. See Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 182 A.2d 22 (Del. Ch. 1962), aff'd,
188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963) (Delaware law gives dissenters appraisal rights only in situation (I).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Supp. 1968)).
59. The bargaining tactics available to a minority vary with the size of its shareholdings.
In Case I, if X had held 34% of the shares of Company A, the majority could not have mustered
the two-thirds vote necessary for the corporate action, could not have forced the merger over
his objection, and would have had to bargain with him. On the other hand, such an increase in
the size of X's investment, would have greatly increased the amount of his loss had he caused
the deal to fail. This greater risk would have given him a larger personal incentive not to
jeopardize a transaction which was in the common interest of all of the shareholders. A larger
stake on X's part could therefore have increased the chances of a voluntary settlement.
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intended to force the minority shareholder alone to sell for the ap-
praisal price.
The result in Case I is not significantly different from that reached
in the cases in which courts have examined the exercise of commercial
contract and property rights to determine whether a party's conduct
is consistent with applicable standards of good faith and commercial
reasonableness, or whether it is "unconscionable." The rule of the
decision seems to be that at some point the law will protect the
majority against an attempted exercise of ownership rights by a mi-
nority shareholder, at least to the extent of denying equitable relief
to one whose conduct is merely an effort to take financial advantage
of the other shareholders." It must follow that, to some extent, the
minority shareholder has a duty not to seek "unfair" advantage over
his associates.
Case I sharply presents the conflict between fiduciary responsibil-
ity and rights of property ownership. Of the bundle of rights which
comprise share ownership, the right to retain one's investment in the
enterprise is most basic and obvious. Where an exercise of this right
deprives other shareholders of a chance for an advantageous sale of
their shares, a bargaining situation arises in which the hold-out has
a very strong position. Of course, bargaining behavior inevitably oc-
curs when differences of opinion arise among shareholders in closely
held corporations. Commentators have long urged that minority
shareholders should obtain a veto through high quorum and voting
requirements, through pooling agreements, or in some other manner,
to protect themselves against majority oppression.6 These arrange-
ments give the minority leverage to protect its interests when dissen-
sion arises. The idea is that when each party occupies a legally forti-
60. See Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 285, 301-03, 78 N.E. 1090, 1095-96
(1906) (dissenting opinion). Stokes is a leading case dealing with pre-emptive rights. It involved
a situation in which a company's articles of incorporation had been amended in order to create
additional shares for the express purpose of sale to an outside group for several times par value,
The amendment and sale were in fact beneficial to all existing shareholders, whose shares
greatly increased in market value as a result of the transaction. The court nevertheless held
that a plaintiff possessing pre-emptive rights was entitled to purchase his prorated portion of
the new issue, at the price paid by the outside group. The dissenting judge characterized the
plaintiff's conduct as "simply an attempt to make something out of his associates." Id. at 303,
78 N.E. at 1096. The case illustrates a situation in which a minority shareholder was enabled
to assert a property right attached to his shares and to profit personally at the expense of his
co-owners.
61. The various aspects of arrangements to deal with these problems are extensively treated
in I F. O'NAL, supra note 43, §§ 3.01-7.29. Professor O'Neal also reviews devices to avoid
and to break deadlock. See id. §§ 9.01-.31.
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fled position, opposing shareholders will be forced by their common
interest in profit to reach a mutually acceptable arrangement. (One
cannot tell the extent to which this actually does happen by examining
case reports.)
Where no agreement is reached between the parties to a bargain-
ing situation, and each party occupies a legally secure position, there
is a standoff. In Cases I and II such an impasse occurred, and litiga-
tion resulted from the majority's attempt to break the stalemate. It
is possible, of course, for a stalemate to occur in any bargaining
situation, but the likelihood of a stalemate is increased where there
is a wide disparity in the stakes for each side. In Case I, because the
minority had relatively little at stake in the corporation, the risk of
the loss of the sale of the business had relatively little impact on
Shareholder X; yet the same uncertainty may have threatened fi-
nancial disaster to the majority shareholder. In Case II, although
failure to implement the proposed subsidiary arrangement would
have resulted in limiting the growth of the company's business, it
would not have threatened Shareholder Y's existing investment and
presumably would have benefited his competing business interest.
Ultimately, both examples are buy-out cases: The question in
each is what price can the minority force the majority to pay for its
shares? To the extent that the minority can prevent management and
the majority from implementing corporate policies and decisions, the
minority can put pressure on the majority to raise the price that it
will be willing to pay to buy out the minority. The litigation in each
case is a price-setting mechanism in which the limits of permissible
bargaining tactics of both sides are determined. The minority's bar-
gaining tactic is obstruction, and the majority's is avoidance or eva-
sion of the obstruction. In Case- I the formal question of law was
whether the defendant could implement a merger which was really a
device to force the sale of the minority's stock; in Case II it was
whether the court would extend the minority's veto power over
amendments to a "de facto amendment" accomplished through the
creation of a subsidiary. In the first instance the avoidance tactic was
permitted, at least partly because of the court's view that the minor-
ity's prior bargaining conduct was improper. This decision settled the
dispute by determining that the highest price the minority share-
holder could get for his shares was the statutory appraisal value. The
decision in Case II did not fix the maximum value of the minority's
shares and did not settle the dispute. It strengthened the minority
shareholder's position in future bargaining and greatly increased the
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buy-out value of his shares. As a result of the case, the majority had
three choices: (1) to abandon its plan for corporate expansion; (2) to
attempt to devise another way to circumvent the minority's obstruc-
tion; or (3) to negotiate for the purchase of the minority's
stock-presumably at a price which would reflect the value to the
business in which the minority shareholder had a competing interest,
of the shareholder's power to block the expansion of Company C.11
When disputes arise in close corporations, all of the rights which
the parties have as owners of stock become bargaining counters.
When in particular situations the courts decide that the use of certain
"rights" will not be permitted, rules are being laid down for the
settlement of disputes within enterprises. And it is unavoidable that
in making such rules, the courts will be influenced by their view of
the conduct and motives of the participants. Those views, in turn, are
certain to be influenced by general notions of good faith, commercial
reasonableness, and unconscionability.
The operation of these factors is quite clearly visible in the judicial
dissolution cases. As the reader is undoubtedly aware, almost all
states have statutes empowering the courts to order dissolution under
certain circumstances because of deadlock. 3 The power is always
discretionary and courts have often been reluctant to exercise it. 4
One commentator has noted that "judicial reluctance" to order disso-
lution is based on recognition of the fact that "dissolution irrevocably
ends a formerly viable concern." 5 This judicial attitude reflects the
view that destruction of solvent enterprises is generally undesirable
from the standpoint of both the public interest and the interest of the
parties directly concerned. However, this analysis fails to take ade-
quate account of the dynamics of the bargaining process in intracor-
62. There is obviously some price at which Shareholder X would sell his shares to Company
C or its other shareholders, and they would plainly like to be rid of him. Presumably, X would
be willing to sell his C shares at any price which exceeded his pro rata interest in the going
concern value of Company C plus the value to his investment in the competing firm of his power
to hinder the competition provided by Company C. It is interesting to note that if Company C
were a partnership, X's conduct would clearly be an actionable breach of X's fiduciary duty to
the firm. See J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, supra note 7.
63. The Model Act provision is typical. See ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 97 (2d
ed. 1971).
64. A leading case is Radom v. Niedorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954), where
the court speaks of "judicially imposed death." Id. at 7, 119 N.E.2d at 565. For a similar result
in a state following the Model Act, see Jackson v. Nicolai-Neppach Co., 219 Ore. 560, 348
P.2d 9 (1959). Cf Strong v. Fromm Labs., Inc., 273 Wis. 159, 72 N.W.2d 389 (1956).
65. Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966 DUKE L.J. 875, 952.
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porate disputes. Dissolution litigation is a bargaining tactic. Once it
is settled whether or not one party can compel dissolution, the stage
is set for final bargaining on the price of his shares.6
In the dissolution cases, as in Cases I and II, the underlying issue
is what limits should be placed on the bargaining tactics used by the
competing factions in disputes among shareholders in close corpora-
tions. The literature dealing with these disputes has been primarily
concerned with majority oppression." Because the majority usually
has control, the means available to it for oppressing the minority are
many and varied, including such policy matters as salary and divi-
dend policy, which may be manipulated to exclude the minority from
the benefits of ownership. On the other hand, the minority generally
has at its disposal two weapons which may be used, as the foregoing
examples illustrate, both offensively and defensively. It may block
transactions for which its approval is required, and it may withhold
its shares where their tender is necessary to conclude a transaction.
Upon what grounds should the courts base a determination of
whether or not a particular exercise of a shareholder's prerogatives
in an intracorporate dispute is lawful? The foregoing discussion pre-
sents a paradox. The argument on the one hand is that in disputes
between owners of the enterprise, each faction may freely use for its
own benefit all the rights attached to the block of shares which it
holds. On the other hand, the argument is that the validity of the
exercise of rights of share ownership in some circumstances is de-
pendent upon the purposes for which the rights are exercised."
66. It is difficult to document this point quantitatively. However, in a number of reported
cases, disputants reached agreement after a court determined whether one party could compel
dissolution. See Hetherington, Special Characteristics, Problems, and Needs of the Close
Corporation, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. I, I1 n.44, 20 n.73. Settlement rather than dissolution probably
follows the determination of most cases in which judicial dissolution is sought. The reason is
obvious: If the business can be operated profitably, it is in everyone's interest that it should
continue to be operated either by one of the disputants or by a purchaser.
67. See note 40 supra.
68. The voluminous periodical literature on various close corporation problems is exten-
sively cited in H. HENN, supra note 3, §§ 257-90. The theme that ties the area together is the
protection of the minority against majority oppression.
69. Generally, corporation statutes are silent on the purposes for which rights given to
shareholders may be exercised. For example, a shareholder may dissent from a proposed
merger or sale of assets for any or no reason and demand payment of the appraised value of
his shares. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. §§ 80-81 (2d ed. 1971). The only statutory right
of shareholders under the Model Act which is expressly conditioned on its being exercised for
a legitimate purpose is the right to inspect books and records. Id. § 46. This section provides
that inspection is available "for any proper purpose." Purposes which are personal to the
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To resolve this apparent inconsistency, it is necessary to distin-
guish between two separate types of disagreements. The first is a
dispute concerning the merits of a particular corporate decision or
policy. The question in such cases is whether a particular course of
action is wise and should be adopted. In disputes of this kind the
majority is entitled to follow the course it thinks best, despite the
most earnest disagreement by the minority. He who has the votes
makes policy. The second type of case arises where there is in fact
no disagreement between the parties on which decision is in the best
interest of the enterprise, but, nevertheless, one faction elects to block
the transaction for personal reasons having nothing to do with the
merits of the decision. Cases I and II both illustrate this type of case.
In the first, the minority shareholder placed the common interest in
jeopardy by demanding a side payment as the price of his coopera-
tion. In the second, the minority shareholder appeared to be using his
investment in Company C as a device for advancing his competing
business interest by preventing the growth of C.
Conduct on the part of the majority similar to that engaged in by
the minority in Cases I and II would be unlawful. The law is settled
that once a policy or decision has been adopted, the majority may
not appropriate to itself a disproportionate share of the proceeds;"0
nor may the majority sacrifice the corporation's business interests to
an outside competing interest. In both of the cases discussed, minor-
shareholder but adverse to the interest of the firm, such as obtaining trade information useful
to a competitor, are improper. See H. HENN, supra note 3, § 199, at 397. The apparent purpose
of the statutory restriction is to limit the exercise of the right to inspect to situations in which
the inspecting shareholder is seeking to advance or protect the interests of shareholders as a
group. The purposes of the minority shareholders in the principal cases, being both personal
and apparently adverse to the common interests of all shareholders, would probably not be
proper if the minority had been seeking to exercise rights under a statute protecting the interests
of shareholders acting "for proper purposes."
70. Cases involving this problem generally arise in connection with a sale of the corpora-
tion's business or assets, or of the controlling block or perhaps all of the shares. If the majority
receives more than its proportionate share of the total proceeds where all shares are sold, or if
the price received for its shares exceeds their reasonable asset or going concern value on the
sale of its shares alone, the possibility of an unlawful premium is present. See the cases and
references to the current literature in W. CARY, supra note 7, at 827-47. For a general statement
and application of the expanding view of the majority's responsibilities in such situations, see
Note, Jones v. Ahmanson: The Fiduciary Obligations of Majority Shareholders, 70 COLUNI.
L. REV. 1079 (1970). In a recent private sale of the controlling block of shares in a large
California corporation, the seller procured from the buyer an offer to take minority shares at
the same price. Counsel for the seller advised this writer that in their view a holding imposing
an obligation on the selling majority shareholder to obtain such an offer in the case of a private
sale was "entirely probable" in California.
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ity interests were attempting to do exactly what the majority may
not do. Further, the means employed by the two minority share-
holders involved the use of the minority's power to control corporate
action in a particular situation, a use of the power of control which
would clearly be unlawful on the part of the majority.
Efforts to obtain a disproportionate share of the value of a corpo-
rate enterprise should be accorded the same treatment whether the
attempts are made by the majority or the minority. Conduct by any
shareholder which is intended to be detrimental to the welfare of the
enterprise or to subordinate its business interests to competing busi-
ness interests of the shareholder is a breach of a duty of loyalty which
all shareholders owe to the common venture. As far as minority
interests are concerned, this proposition merely amounts to saying
that where the minority's conduct makes a difference, it ought to be
equally accountable for its behavior and motives as the majority.
In other commercial contexts, as we have observed, the exercise
of contract and property rights for retaliatory or other "improper"
purposes may be constrained to protect the interests and reasonable
expectations of other individuals to whom no fiduciary obligation is
owed. The same line of reasoning suggests with greater force that, in
closely held companies where the shareholders are bound together by
a community of interest, the deliberate exercise of property rights to
the detriment of the common purpose is not a legally permissible
exercise of the shareholder's powers. The courts have developed a
large body of precedent for the purpose of insuring that the majority
in controlling the enterprise will seek to promote the common inter-
est;7. the majority is entitled to a similar assurance in cases where
circumstances have placed effective control in the hands of the minor-
ity.
7 1. The classic cases from which the scope of the majority's duties are developed are, of
course, well known. Notable among them are Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.
1955) and Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1941), which are familiar to generations of
law students. And more recently, the development of the majority duties was expanded in a
somewhat different direction in Jones v. Ahmanson, I Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr.
592 (1969). In this case the majority in a closely held corporation was found to have an
obligation to permit minority shareholders to share in a public market for the shares of the
corporation which the majority had created through a holding company. The scope of the direct
obligation between the majority and minority, not involving direct corporate action by the
majority, is yet to be developed. See generally Note, supra note 70.
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IV
CONCLUSION
It is impossible to devise an all-inclusive formula which defines
the scope of shareholder rights and the limits of intracorporate bar-
gaining in precise terms. Each shareholder is entitled to assume that
the other shareholders will not intentionally exercise their rights
as owners for the purpose of damaging or destroying the common
venture. A minority shareholder could not rationally make any other
assumption, because his investment is continually subject to decisions
of other individuals over whom, in the absence of special provisions
in the articles or by-laws, he has no control. Loyalty is therefore the
surrogate for control, and the courts have been alert to protect the
minority in its unavoidable dependence on the majority. The reason
that the idea of minority loyalty seems novel is that the minority
position affords less opportunity for abuse. However, such opportuni-
ties do arise, and in such cases the policies underlying the fiduciary
responsibilities imposed on those who have control should be applica-
ble to any shareholder whose vote or other conduct as a shareholder
is in fact controlling in the particular situation.
In spite of the apparent and inevitable imprecision of such criteria
for evaluating commercial behavior as good faith, commercial rea-
sonableness, and unconscionability, the courts have moved toward
imposing minimum requirements of fair dealing in nonfiduciary busi-
ness situations. The similarly imprecise concept of fiduciary responsi-
bility, at least as applied to majority shareholders, has not caused the
courts great difficulty, and it has clearly promoted fair dealing within
business enterprises. The majority may not exercise their corporate
powers in a manner which is clearly intended to be and is in fact
inimical to the corporate interest, or which is intended to deprive the
minority of its pro rata share of the present or future gains accruing
to the enterprise. A minority shareholder whose conduct is control-
ling on a particular issue should be bound by no different standard.
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